Chapter 13
Globally we have one, commonly shared atmosphere. Airplanes need permission to fl y through the air space of different countries; chemicals in the atmosphere do not. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are no exception. It takes 2 to 30 days for traced chemicals to drift across the Atlantic Ocean provided they remain stable over such periods. Remnants of sandstorms originating in the Sahara Desert can be observed in Florida, and the smoke of an Alaskan fire can be observed across the European continent. The transport mechanism usually involves atmospheric air currents. One of the most effective mixing mechanisms is a vertical air rise due to density differentials to reach the upper troposphere where the air currents are stronger, followed by drift with those air currents. The long-distance drift of anthropogenic pollutants is measured by specially designed satellite projects, aircraft measurements, and ground monitoring. Th e data are fed into weather and climate computer models constantly tested by comparing the models’ predictions with observations. The research effort is international in scope and involves cooperation on many levels. Some of it is spearheaded by the United Nations (UN) and much of it involves direct agreements between governmental and supergovernmental (such as European Union [EU]) research organizations. The required political follow-up for policy recommendations is a work in progress. This chapter examines this process.
The recent history of environmental policy making follows the interplay between the spatial scope of environmental threats and the ability of governance structure to regulate and mitigate the threats. The mixing and spreading of anthropogenic trace chemicals is much more effective in the atmosphere than on sea and land, although cross-boundary transport of pollutants through the water cycle is a serious problem. The earliest management of air pollutants focused on local visible irritants such as smoke, soot, and odors. National standards in the United States for air quality control were issued in the 1970s and include mandatory standards for pollutants such as ozone, oxides of sulfur and nitrogen, lead, suspended particles, and so
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forth. The process has expanded to longer-range transport with the realization that environmental effects such as acid rain are often caused by sources hundreds of miles away and oft en cross national boundaries.
The breakthrough was the realization that once chlorofluorocarbons reach the stratosphere, they destroy the ozone layer that blocks the solar ultraviolet radiation from reaching the surface of Earth. This process was described in detail in Chapter 6. The international agreement that resulted from this discovery will be described in this chapter.
World governance is based on sovereign states. States can issue laws and enforce the laws within the jurisdiction of those states. The governance in most countries is more complicated. Many of them are federal with a clear distinction between local and federal jurisdictions. However, most countries directly and indirectly created legal structures in which final jurisdiction rests at the sovereign-state level. Multinational and global issues are decided through incorporation of international laws into the legal codes of sovereign states or through mutual, not necessarily codified, agreements. International law consists of long-standing customs, provisions of treaties, and general principles of law recognized by nations.
The present system of international law remains largely consensual and centers on the sovereign state. It is within the discretion of each state to participate in the negotiation of, or to sign or ratify, any international treaty. Likewise, each member state of an international organization such as the UN is free to ratif y any convention adopted by that organization. Treaty law is thus created by the express will of states. Enforcement of international law is oft en difficult because nations are sovereign (independent) powers that may put their own interests ahead of those of the international community. In addition, the mechanisms of enforcement are new and not well developed. Enforcement may be effectively achieved, however, through the actions of individual nations, agencies of international organizations such as the UN, and international courts. The UN Security Council can authorize economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, or military force to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Customary international law is unwritten and derives from the actual practices of nations over time. To be accepted as law, the custom must be long-standing, widespread, and practiced in a uniform and consistent way throughout nations. Treaties represent another source of customary law. Although treaties generally bind only those countries that ratif y them, customs may be deduced from the rules and statements contained in treaties. These new customs may be considered binding even on those states that did not sign and ratif y the original treaty. W hether or not they are embodied in a written treaty, customs become part of international law because of continued acceptance by the great majority of nations. Some customary international law has been codified in recent years. For example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which was approved in 1969 and took effect in 1980, codified the customary law that treaties between sovereign states are binding on their signatories and must be followed in good faith. The Vienna Convention states that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to abide by an international treaty. Every nation is expected to obey international law. Failing to do so will rarely bring international police or an army to enforce the law, but it can provoke international retaliation in other areas of the law.
In this chapter I will focus on recent international treaties that attempt to stabilize the chemistry of the atmosphere and the resulting climatic consequences of these treaties.
The Power to Influence Sovereign States
Sovereign states drive the global environmental agenda through international organizations, treaties, etc. W hat determines the agenda of these states? This depends on many factors, principal of which is the form of the states’ governments. The time of the prince- philosopher ruler (Plato) or the French king (Louis XIV), reported to declare, “the state, it is I,” is over in most of the world’s countries. The time when communication was a reserved privilege, in which information mainly flowed to the general population from the government, which directly or indirectly controlled the means of communication, is coming to an end in most countries. Globally we are now participating in a profound communication revolution, through the spread of the Internet and mobile phones, that emerged from the electronics revolution during the second half of the 20th century. Table 13.1 shows the penetration of these technologies into selected countries and the changes of penetration over the last 3 years for which data are available. We can see that although these technologies have much deeper penetration into the industrialized countries, the developing countries are catching up fast.
Newspapers and books have been available since the invention of the printing press, and in some countries radio and television are providing news independent of the government. However none of these communication tools can compare with the mass communication avalanche made possible through the use of the new communication tools. These tools provide effective vehicles to organize across state lines and form discussion groups, chat groups, web logs (electronic diaries or blogs), and organizational web pages in which people who share a common interest can coordinate their activities. Some governments are trying to limit the information that can be exchanged, with very limited success. A 2010 search of blogs that
Telephones (fixed line and mobile), Internet users, and personal computers per 1000 people (2002/1999)
| Countr y | Phone subscribers | Internet subscribers | Personal computers |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 328/120 | 46/7 | 28/12 |
| France | 1216/944 | 314/92 | 347/267 |
| India | 58/28 | 16/3 | 7/3 |
| Japan | 1195/1006 | 449/214 | 382/287 |
| Nigeria | 19/4 | 3.5/0.46 | 7/6.4 |
| United States | 1114/970 | 551/397 | 659/507 |
| World | 364/234 | 131/59 | 101/69 |
Source: World Bank.1
discuss global warming indicates about 24 million hits. I did not check whether all are relevant, but the opportunities are obviously there. Governments will disassociate from such a conversation at their own peril. As we will see as we follow the Kyoto Protocol, this technology also forces governments on all levels to be more transparent, which in turn helps to assure that globally sound environmental practices are followed.
Local Governments, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Corporations
Andorra, with about 70,000 citizens, is a sovereign state; California, with a population of close to 40 million, is not. W hen the majority of the residents of California became unhappy (or the state government estimated they were unhappy) with decisions at the federal level, they entered into an agreement with a few other states to impose their own limits on GHG emissions. About nine states on the East Coast of the United States did the same. These actions will likely be constitutionally challenged in federal courts on the ground of interference in interstate commerce, but it is also likely that the issue will remain in the forefront of the public’s consciousness and require constant attention, convincing the federal government to realign its policies to those of the rest of the world.
Nongovernmental Organizations
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly becoming key players in global governance on issues of transnational concern. They are usually single- issue organizations that get independent funding or get contracts from state agencies to carry out specific missions. Th ese organizations can be local, national, regional, or global. Although they were functioning in various forms well before the Internet, they got a big boost from the enhanced communication capabilities that the Internet provides. In order to participate in global activities spearheaded by the UN, they need to be accredited. There are about 2000 NGOs currently accredited with the UN. Of these organizations, 430 are accredited with the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) that provides grants to developing countries for projects benefiting the global environment. GEF funds originate from developed countries. Local and international NGOs participate in activities both at the project level and at the level of broader policy recommendations.
Corporations
The business of corporations is business. Uncertainty is not good for business. Th e General Electric Corporation (GE) has recently started a campaign they have labeled “Ecomagination,” which includes a worldwide, coordinated effort to cut its GHG emissions, boost environmental technology spending, and make sure the world knows about it. Its chief executive has called on the United States to set mandatory limits for carbon emissions— that is, to join the rest of the world and implement the Kyoto Protocol without explicitly stating it. This is not necessarily an expression of good citizenship—GE is hoping they can do good business with green technologies that involve many of the alternative energy sources discussed in Chapter 11. Most power companies are still opposed to mandatory emission targets, but some are more opposed than others. The push and pull within the US business community is currently at full strength. There is no doubt the results will aff ect policy.
The Montreal Protocol
The connection between the stratospheric ozone and chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) widely used in refrigerators, air- conditioners, and as dry-cleaning sprays was examined in Chapter 6. Toward the end of the 1970s, it became increasingly clear through the eff orts of scientists such as Paul Crutzen, Mario Molina, and Sherwood Rowland that stratospheric ozone is destroyed by anthropogenic emissions of CFCs and other ozone- depleting chemicals. By 1985 it was established that the chemical- induced ozone destruction was responsible both for the formation of a large stratospheric hole in the ozone layer centered on Antarctica and for the thinning of the ozone layer in other locations. It was also established that the thinning of the ozone layer increases the atmospheric penetration of ultraviolet solar radiation that directly contributes to skin cancer. This was clearly a global challenge to which the world community, through the leadership of the UN, was able to react quickly and eff ectively.
In 1985, the Vienna Convention established mechanisms for international cooperation in research on the ozone layer and the effects of ozone- depleting chemicals. On the basis of this agreement, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer was signed in 1987 in Montreal, Canada. This was followed by periodic multinational meetings for updates and follow-ups.
The agreement called for the parties to phase out the use of CFCs and other man- made ozone- depleting chemicals. The protocol stipulates (with some minor exceptions) that production and consumption of ozone- depleting chemicals should be phased out by the year 2000. The agreement includes threats of trade sanctions in case of noncompliance and off ers incentives for nonsignatory nations to join. The agreement was designed to be flexible enough to accommodate periodic scientific and technological assessments that might require changes in the schedule and in the list of chemicals covered by the protocol. Governments are not legally bound by the protocol until they ratif y it. So far, 189 countries have ratified the protocol. The ratification of the amendments is a bit slower.
The results were spectacular: the annual global production of CFCs declined sharply immediately following the signing of the agreement. The stratospheric concentrations of ozone- depleting chemicals declined following a rising trend prior to the agreement. Th e present predictions are that the ozone layer will recover over the next 50 years, conditional on continuing compliance.
The UN secretary general was heard to say that “perhaps the single most successful international agreement to date has been the Montreal Protocol.” 2
The international community regards the Montreal Protocol as a good template for an agreement on other global environmental threats such as GHGs. However, there are two major differences between the two issues:
The Earth Summit
With the apparent success of the Montreal Protocol and first report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; see Chapter 8) in 1990 on the possible global impact of climate change induced by anthropogenic contributions from the burning of fossil fuel, the world was ready to tackle global environmental threats through a systematic, holistic approach. The Earth Summit conference was convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992 to reconcile global economic development with the protection of the environment. Th e participants included representatives from 178 nations, 117 heads of state, and many of the leading NGOs. At this conference most nations started to formally commit to pursuing economic development in ways consistent with a global sustainable environment. This commitment was codifi ed in the Rio Declaration, included here in its entirety in Appendix 3. Th e declaration establishes the balance between environmental concerns and economic development (principles 2 and 3). It states that “environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of a development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it” (principle 4). It acknowledges the differential responsibility of developed and developing countries (principle 7) and states that “each individual should have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities” (principle 10), thus acknowledging the necessity of transparency. Pointedly, there is no mention of the necessity to ensure that individuals will be able to understand the information.
Aside from the Rio Declaration, the main binding documents agreed on are the Convention on Biological Diversity, which requires nations to take inventories of their plants and wild animals and protect their endangered species; Agenda 21, which outlines strategies for cleaning the environment and encourages environmentally sound development; and the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which addresses global warming. A related nonbinding Statement of Principle on Forests was issued to try to preserve the world’s forests. Appendix 3 provides the main articles and principles of the global warming agreement known as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The full text of the UNFCCC and the other agreements can be found on the UN website.3
The UNFCCC states, “The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time- frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”
The signatories to the UNFCCC are split into three groups: Annex I countries (industrialized countries); Annex II countries, which are the Annex I countries rich enough to support some costs of the developing countries (excluding countries previously a part of the eastern bloc and very small countries such as Liechtenstein and Monaco); and the developing countries. By this agreement, Annex I countries agree to reduce their GHG emission to target levels below their 1990 emissions. If they cannot do so, then they must buy emission credits or invest in conservation. Developing countries have no immediate restrictions under the UNFCCC, but they must develop an accounting system that will monitor their GHG level. Th e convention also established committees responsible for implementation (articles 7– 10); these include the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Secretariat, and a Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. The UNFCCC entered into force upon ratification by 50 countries in March 1994. Since then the parties have been meeting annually to establish legally binding obligations and assess progress in dealing with the issues. As a result of these meetings, a binding protocol was drafted in the COP-3 meeting in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan.
The Kyoto Protocol
Appendix 3 provides the main articles and principles of the Kyoto Protocol. The full text of the Kyoto Protocol can be found on the UNFCCC website.3 In accordance with the protocol, parties from developed countries are committed to reduce their combined GHG emissions by at least 5% from the 1990 levels by the period 2008– 2012. By 2005 developed countries must have made demonstrable progress. The protocol establishes innovative mechanisms known as joint implementation emissions trading (article 6), clean development mechanisms (CDM; article 12), and emission trading (article 17), designed to reduce the cost of implementation in the developed countries and to provide resources to the developing countries to reduce their emissions. The protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005, upon ratification by countries responsible for more than 55% of the GHG emissions. The most notable exception to ratification is the United States, which, upon an administration change after the 2000 elections, decided not to be a part of the Kyoto process.
Under the clean development mechanism, developed countries can get credit for financing emission of GHGs in developing countries. Under the emission trading mechanism, developed countries can trade emission rights with other developed countries, and under the joint implementation mechanism, developed countries can implement projects in other countries that remove or reduce the amount of carbon in the atmosphere and get credit for the reduction. The number of emission credits provides a controlled ceiling for GHG emissions, and the various trading options provide companies with mechanisms to achieve emission limits at a lowest possible cost. The success or failure of the process depends on stringent verification mechanisms and full transparency. Much of the post-Kyoto international effort is dedicated to achieving these objectives.
As of 2010, the mechanisms for implementation are in some disarray. In 2005, the 25 countries of the EU, which are committed to joint implementation, launched their emission trading systems (ETSs).4 Currently, ETSs cover emission of carbon dioxide by large emission sources.
Nevertheless, it covers more than 10,000 organizations, and the trading volume was expected to reach $13 billion/year by 2008. The emission limits are established through national allocation plans by which each country gets emission credit allowances with each unit of allowance corresponding to the right to emit 1 ton of carbon dioxide. The individual countries distribute the allowances (presently no money is changing hands) to the emitting companies that then trade them with other organizations or countries. At the end of each year, the companies are expected to surrender allowances that correspond to the volume of the actual emissions. In most cases the emission volumes are calculated based on the fuel input, the nature and volume of the output (e.g., cement production), or both. Since its inception, the price of an allowance has increased steadily to reach €30/ton of CO2 on April 2006. On September 2007 the price fell to €0.1/ton. This decline stems from the present global uncertainty as to the post-Kyoto (2012) global regulatory environment for GHG emissions.
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol require significant progress by 2005. Th e United States took itself out of the Kyoto Protocol, but as was mentioned before, this is not necessarily a reason to predict that the United States will be out of step with the rest of the world in terms of compliance. As of 2010, it might be too early to tell, as the latest consistent data on all relevant parameters are for 2006.
The timeline is relatively simple. The baseline is 1990, the Earth Summit took place in 1992, the UNFCCC was ratified in 1994, and the Kyoto Protocol was set in 1997 and ratified in 2005. The Kyoto Protocol was set to show progress in 2005 and it basically expires in 2012. Tables 13.2– 13.4 show the results for seven countries that constitute 53% of the CO2 emissions in 2006 and 46% in 1990. The table includes representatives from the three income groups and account for more than half the world population. All three tables include the corresponding global data. The first two tables also include the corresponding per-capita numbers. From 1990 to 2006 the global CO2 emission increased by 40% compared to a 33% increase in global energy use. The global per-capita CO2 emission and energy use hardly changed. Th e diff erence in the emission and energy use also indicates the CO2 intensity increased— more emission for the same energy use. The Annex II countries included in the tables, which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, did rather well. These countries include France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. From 1990 to 2006 their CO2 emission increased by 10% compared to a 12% increase in their energy use. China is the obvious leader in its increases CO2 emission (more than 250%) and energy use (214%). Recently China became the largest global CO2 emitter. Most of the Chinese increase was due to a per-capita increase because of very fast economic development, not an increase in population. Table 13.4 shows that China decreased their energy intensity (energy/GDP; Chapter 9) by 50%. Within the Kyoto framework, China is a developing country only obligated of increased transparency in terms of emission and energy use. Th e United
CO2 emissions (kilotons)/(emissions/capita [metric tons])
| Countr y | 1990 | 1994 | 2000 | 2006 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 209,000/1.4 | 242,000/1.5 | 330,000/1.9 | 352,000/1.9 |
| China | 2,413,000/2.1 | 2,997,000/2.5 | 3,403,000/2.7 | 6,099,000/4.7 |
| France | 398,000/7 | 369,000/6.4 | 367,000/6.2 | 383,000/6.2 |
| India | 690,000/0.8 | 864,000/0.9 | 1,186,000/1.2 | 1,509,000/1.4 |
| Japan | 1,171,000/9.5 | 1,250,000/10 | 1,259,000/9.9 | 1,292,000/10.1 |
| United Kingdom | 573,000/10 | 563,000/9.7 | 548,000/9.3 | 568,000/9.4 |
| United States | 4,861,000/19.5 | 5,219,000/19.8 | 5,738,000/20.3 | 5,748,000/19.3 |
| World | 22,512,000/4.3 | 22,871,000/4.1 | 24,677,000/4.1 | 30,155,000/4.4 |
Source: World Bank.1
Energy use (kilotons oil equivalent)/(energy use/capita [kg of oil equivalent/capita])
| Country | 1990 | 1994 | 2000 | 2006 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 140,000/933 | 155,000/973 | 189,000/1086 | 223,000/1185 |
| China | 863,000/760 | 980,000/822 | 1,092,000/865 | 1,845,000/1407 |
| France | 224,000/3957 | 228,000/3958 | 252,000/4299 | 268,000/4363 |
| India | 318,000/374 | 365,000/400 | 457,000/450 | 561,000/505 |
| Japan | 438,000/3546 | 481,000/3846 | 518,000/4080 | 518,000/4057 |
| United Kingdom | 207,000/3619 | 217,000/3744 | 224,000/3803 | 219,000/3464 |
| United States | 1,913,000/7664 | 2,046,000/7776 | 2,283,000/8092 | 2,303,000/7861 |
| World | 8,555,000/1666 | 8,777,000/1606 | 9,733,000/1646 | 11,370,000/1793 |
Source: World Bank.1
States is another outsider that needs specific analysis. In terms of GDP per capita, the United States is the richest country among those mentioned in Tables 13.2– 13.4. From 1990 to 2006 US CO2 emission increased by 12% compared to a 12% increase in their energy use. Th e per-capita value remains approximately the same— almost twice as large as other rich countries in the list. With a bit more than 4% of world’s population, the US carbon emission is close to 20%, and its energy use about the same fraction. Its energy intensity is the highest among the listed developed countries, but it came down considerably from 1990 (about 25%). It is clear from the data in these tables that without binding commitments from China and the United States, a global binding commitment for reduction of GHGs is impossible.
Energy intensity (kg oil equivalent/$1000 GDP [constant 2005 PPP])
| Country | 1990 | 1994 | 2000 | 2006 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 130 | 130 | 137 | 135.5 |
| China | 692 | 489 | 325 | 311 |
| France | 159 | 155.5 | 147 | 140 |
| India | 310 | 299 | 262 | 209 |
| Japan | 137 | 142 | 143 | 131 |
| United Kingdom | 152 | 151 | 128 | 108 |
| United States | 240 | 233 | 207 | 181 |
| World | 238 | 226 | 203.5 | 190 |
Source: World Bank.1
The 2008 presidential election in the United States brought with it a new government committed to work toward a post-Kyoto binding global agreement to reduce GHG emissions. Th e losing candidate was also campaigning in this spirit. One of the other remaining governments showing hostility to Kyoto (Australia) was also replaced by the party advocating to join the effort. It seems the world is finally prepared to act together to face the issue. All eyes were focused on Copenhagen.
Copenhagen
The 2009 UN Climate Change conference was held in Copenhagen, Denmark, on December 7– 18 to draft a global framework for climate change mitigation beyond 2012. The result was a great disappointment. The conference did not result in any binding document for ratification. A document was drafted by a small group of nations, including the United States and China, India, South Africa, and Brazil.5 The document was mainly declaratory and it was agreed that the other delegates will take note of the document. Many countries have declared commitments to reduce emission, but these were soft commitments with varying base years. At best it can be described as work in progress.
GLOBAL SECURITY VERSUS NATIONAL SECURITY
It is not surprising that almost every aspect of global warming is controversial. The science is less controversial among professional scientists who study the issue than it sometimes seems from press reports. Nevertheless, any observation not explained in a straightforward manner
based on conventional wisdom is viewed by some, and often portrayed, as a refutation of the basic premises. (I emphasized in Chapter 1 that the scientific method is based on the principle that a single observation that contradicts an established theory is suffi cient to render the theory invalid). The noisy global temperature data discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 provide ample opportunity for skeptics. Regardless of the directly observed temporal and spatial aspects of the consequences, the basic premise that anthropogenic changes to the atmosphere will have major effects on the climate through changes of the solar energy balance can withstand scrutiny. We fail to act upon this premise at our peril. But, as the argument continues, global warming is much too important to be left to scientists to decide actions and remedies. Throughout this book I have consistently described the required change in behavior as a feeding transition— namely, that the science is solid enough to initiate a global transition from very convenient fossil fuels to largely experimental nonfossil fuels. The majority of the world’s community agrees: the political process started with the Rio Declaration, matured to implementation with the Kyoto Protocol, and got somewhat shaken with Copenhagen is a testimony to this sentiment. As was mentioned previously, the agreement is not universal, and it is still at the center of a continuous debate.
In Chapter 10 the case was made that the global reserves of conventional fuels—namely, oil and natural gas— will run out within 2 generations. The distribution of the resources was given in Table 10.4, from which we can deduce that most of the oil reserves are not located within the jurisdictions of the industrialized countries. Thirty years ago, political instabilities in the Middle East (the Arab–Israeli war and the Iran–Iraq war) gave rise to major oil shortages that resulted in major price increases. At that time industrial economies were much more affected by the price of oil than they are now, mainly because the economies in industrialized countries were more dependent on industry and agriculture. Since then, as a result of increased political stability in the regions holding most of the world’s oil supply and the reduced dependence on oil in the industrialized countries due to the significant increase of the service sector in their economies, the price of oil first significantly declined and then stabilized as measured in inflation- adjusted dollars. After 2000, the price of oil started to climb; in 2005 the price rose by nearly 50% in 6 months to reach $70/barrel. In inflation- adjusted dollars, the price was still below the peak during the Iran–Iraq war (about $85 in 2005 dollars) but very close. After the 2008 global recession, the price declined again to around $70/barrel, as of 2010. Th e recent price increase is more complicated compared to the previous increase because it did not involve wars or other political instabilities but rather antiquated infrastructure (mainly refining capacity) in industrialized countries, a growing appetite from fast-moving developing countries such as India and China, and a nondeclining appetite in the United States. As of 2010, the effect on industrial countries is not as severe as it was in the 1980s, mainly because of increased energy efficiency in industrial economies. However, there is already enough of a disturbance for people to get nervous. W hen people get nervous, politicians get nervous. In such circumstances there is a tendency to try to find culprits not under our (the sovereign state) control. We (governments) cannot be blamed for the actions of culprits not under our control. Dynamics like this lead to a collective desire to have our energy needs supplied internally. For industrial countries currently importing significantly more than 50% of their energy needs, this is an impossible objective without a major feeding transition, but striving to achieve energy independence is a powerful force that comes under the label of national security. Currently in the United States this is one of the two dominant forces for government action in the energy area (the other one is climate change, as it’s gett ing hott er).
There is a considerable degree of overlap between global security through sustainable energy use and self- reliance in energy supply. But there are also major diff erences. Th e overlap is in areas such as conservation and alternative energy sources that were described in Chapter 11. The emphasis on conservation limits dependence on imported energy sources by an overall reduction in energy demand. The emphasis on renewable energy sources is because almost all the major candidates to replace fossil fuels require innovative technologies. In large part the technologies are based on universally shared science, and they are subject to national decisions as to the allocation of development resources and their subsidized use during the transition. The last statement is biased because it currently applies only to the developed countries; in many cases developing countries do not have the resources needed to develop new technologies. This reality is in constant fl ux and is changing rapidly due the rapid economic development in the most populous developing countries. China is now the leading producer of alternative energy sources. The international community, through the series of agreements previously described, recognizes this reality and puts the burden of the development of the new energy sources on the shoulders of the industrialized countries.
The main difference between global security and national security objectives is in two areas: (1) the continuous search for fossil fuels regardless of climatic and other environmental consequences and (2) nuclear energy.
The Continuous Search for Fossil Fuels
Currently, a search for new deposits of fossil fuels becomes controversial only if energy companies seek permission to explore protected areas such as off-shore formations and sites such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska. However, the most serious global controversies are still likely to surface. If we go back to Chapter 10, the fork was placed at the point where we collectively must decide how to replace the present feedstock of oil and natural gas, either by replacing fossil fuels with alternative fuel sources that do not contribute to irreversible changes in the atmospheric chemistry or by shifting to alternative and abundant fossil fuel sources, such as coal and methane hydrates. The reported reserves of these are so large that catastrophic consequences due to climate change can be expected unless active steps are taken to limit the damage (business as usual in the Special Report on Emission Scenarios [SRES] scenarios). At present, our knowledge of the global distribution of methane hydrates is limited. We have much better data on the global distribution of coal deposits.
Table 13.5 provides recent estimates of the global distribution of coal together with the reserves/yearly production (R/P) ratio that approximates the availability of the resources. Comparison of Table 13.5 with Table 10.4, which showed the global oil distribution, shows the important diff erences in the nature of the distribution. Oil and natural gas are mostly found in the Middle East, whereas major coal deposits are found in four countries: the United States, Russia, China, and India. Together these four countries account for approximately half the world’s population and are among the fastest growing economies. If national security considerations win the political debate in these countries, then the fork will come considerably earlier than our estimates in Chapter 10 based on global availability of oil and natural gas.
Table 13.5.
Proven reserves of coal at the end of 2004 (million tons)
| Total | Share of total (%) | R/P ratio | |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 246,643 | 27.1 | 245 |
| Total North America | 254,432 | 28.0 | 235 |
| Total South and Central America | 19,893 | 2.2 | 290 |
| Russian Federation | 157,010 | 17.3 | |
| Total Europe and Eurasia | 287,095 | 31.6 | 242 |
| South Africa | 48,750 | 5.4 | 201 |
| Total Africa and Middle East | 50,755 | 5.6 | 204 |
| Australia | 78,500 | 8.6 | 215 |
| China | 114,500 | 12.6 | 59 |
| India | 92,445 | 10.2 | 229 |
| Total Asia-Pacific | 296,889 | 32.7 | 101 |
| Total world | 909,064 | 100.0 | 164 |
Note: Designated countries have a minimum of 5% of the reserves. Source: British Petroleum.6
Nuclear Energy
We saw in Chapter 11 that, currently, only three signifi cant nonfossil sources of energy contribute to the global energy mix: nuclear energy, hydropower, and wood. Nuclear energy contributes around 6% of global energy needs. However, the global distribution is not uniform. Of the world’s nuclear energy, 85% is used by rich, industrialized countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD). The remaining 15% is used by the countries of the former Soviet Union. Nuclear energy supplies around 10% of the energy needs of the OECD countries. As was mentioned in Chapter 11, this situation is also in constant flux because of China’s growth as a producer of nuclear energy. Most developing countries hardly use any nuclear energy. In fact, when some of them, such as North Korea and Iran, recently expressed interest in using nuclear energy and started programs to acquire or develop the technology to do so, they found themselves less sovereign than they wished to be. The industrial countries strongly objected, claiming, not without good reasons, that the real interest of these countries was to develop nuclear weapon capabilities and bypass the international effort to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It is an inescapable conclusion that international efforts to enable developing countries who are not yet members of the nuclear club to use nuclear energy as part of an alternative energy mix are in need of development to recognize that smaller, developing countries are just as entitled to feel secure in their energy sources as rich, industrial countries.
From my own perspective, the most surprising confluence of national security and global warming came as a report drafted by two US Pentagon researchers, dated October 2003, titled “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security.”7 At the top of the report it states that “the purpose of this report is to imagine the unthinkable— to push the boundaries of current research on climate change so we may better understand the potential implications on United States national security.” This is followed by a declaration that “we have created a climate change scenario that although not the most likely, is plausible, and would challenge United States national security in ways that should be considered immediately.” The report outlines in some detail abrupt regional climate changes, where some regions undergo major cooling and some major warming. The changes induce major disruptions in food, energy, and water supply that in turn lead to political instabilities, regional conflicts, and so forth, posing a significant threat to US national security. Such reports might add to the influences to convince the United States to join the implementation of Kyoto, either formally or informally.
In the next chapter I will try to go from the collective to the personal: what can each one of us do to mitigate the environmental impact of our energy use.
